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Gen. Bryan “Doug” Brown doesn’t command typical GIs. He is the leader of an elite branch – the toughest of the tough, the best of the best – the U.S. Special Forces. When Brown says a Navy SEAL has to be “tougher than the environment we are asking him to work in,” it is reminiscent of Richard Crenna’s character in the Rambo films saying, “what you choose to call hell, he calls home.”
Brown is the quintessential special-forces soldier, a breed known for its tough airborne training and “Quiet Professionals” moniker. A member of American Legion Post 273 in Madeira Beach, Fla., he is expected to retire this summer after a 40-year career in the U.S. Army, which included service in Vietnam, Grenada and Desert Storm. He recently spoke with The American Legion Magazine from his office at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, where he leads the U.S. Special Operations Command.
The American Legion Magazine: What does Special Operations Command do?
Gen. Doug Brown: Twenty years ago, Congress established a Special Operations Command and gave us what we call ‘service-like responsibility.’ In other words, we are responsible for the combat readiness of all special-operations groups. We’re responsible for the acquisition of special-operations-unique equipment. We monitor our own people for promotions and schooling for all the special-operations groups. We run our own budgets. We have RDT and E authority – research, training, development and evaluation – meaning that we can acquire equipment systems and vehicles from start to finish as if we were our own military service.
So there are a lot of authorities that the Congress invested in this command. The reason Congress gave us this authority goes back to the mission to rescue American hostages held in Iran in 1980 (Desert One). The failure at Desert One led a lot of people to question the structure of our special-operations forces. What did they consist of? How are they commanded and controlled? How are they budgeted? How are they taken care of? And so what in fact happened was the Congress started some discussions on how to fix special operations in the United States. There was one joint unit stood up at Joint Special Operations Command in Fort Bragg, N.C.. But then Grenada took place and again it was disjointed. It was better, we had a successful operation at Grenada, unlike Desert One, but it still showed the complexities of special-operations forces coming out of all the services without having one specific command and control headquarters, someone to ensure that the funding was balanced and robust.
By 1986, the Congress passed the Nunn-Cohen amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which simply said there will be a Special Operations Force, it will be commanded by a four-star general, and he will be given certain powers and authorities that will allow us to have a very robust and professional special-operations force. We’ve had special-operations forces in the services for a long time – the Army Green Berets and the Navy UDTs (Underwater Demolition Teams) are good examples. But resourcing was spotty, and quite frankly there were times when they were taken down to next to nothing. We did not have the aircraft we needed, the C-130s – the Air Force Special Operations Command to go into Desert One – and so they fixed it. And so here we are 20 years later with a very robust force, a very capable force that quite frankly in the opening days of Operation Enduring Freedom did over 20 missions that were of longer duration and more complex than Desert One.
Q: This command was established during the Cold War. Was more of an emphasis placed on conventional rather than counter-terrorism warfare at the beginning?
A: Absolutely. This isn’t a criticism, it’s just because of the type of threat we were facing – a nuclear threat, the large Soviet threat and the “close-the-gap” scenario. The emphasis was on conventional forces as opposed to special-operations forces. There was some acknowledgement that this was important. President Kennedy acknowledged this when he gave us our green berets, but quite frankly it never took off with the energy that it needed until Congress passed the Nunn-Cohen amendment.
Q: What is the biggest challenge when fighting an enemy willing to use asymmetrical tactics such as suicide bombers, car bombers and the intentional targeting of civilians?
A: It is very difficult to fight someone with whom you have trouble finding something that he holds dear. You can’t sanction al Qaeda because it isn’t a nation. This enemy is not susceptible to the normal ideas that people have about how to hold an enemy at risk. Because of their willingness to use asymmetric means, there is a requirement to figure out different moves as well as using all of those counter-insurgency methods that have proved successful in the past. This is a thinking, fighting enemy, and we have to be thinking and fighting faster and harder than he is.
Q: How do Special Forces A-Teams operate?
A: We have all of the components of Army, Navy, Air Force and now Marines in Special Operations Command. But probably the heart of all Army special operations is the Special Forces A-Team. It’s a 12-man team commanded by a captain with one warrant officer and 10 NCOs, and they are culturally trained. They are language qualified. They will not graduate unless they have a language capability, it doesn’t matter how well they do, how many push-ups that they do or how tough they are. They will not graduate from the qualification course unless they speak the language. And so they go on a battlefield.
I spent Christmas at an FOB (forward operating base) a couple of years ago that had a special-forces team on it. They did the wide range of activities. They trained the Afghan national army from a small outpost where they were out there all by themselves not close to any other American supporting forces. They were running a medical clinic for the locals. They had just finished a new school where 135 children were attending. They had made friends and were building a relationship with the people in these three small villages. They went out on patrol every day with the Afghan National Army, providing security from the Taliban forces in the one valley that they were living in. I went out with them and met some of the local Pashtun tribal leaders with whom they had excellent relations.
And so what happens? This one 12-man team that was culturally trained, had the language capability, were experts in not only the indirect side of warfare, but they can do the direct attributes as well, and built these relationships. The local people wanted them to stay. It showed validity in the local government because they started seeing human services provided. It showed education alternatives for their children. It showed medical care and how they can be successful in the future by improving their medical capability. It also showed security because these guys were out on the street ... If you put all that together from one 12-man A-Team, what you have is a small area of stability and security and locals who will tell you where an IED or a weapons cache is because they want you to stay there. And that is how a Special Forces A-Team is highly successful.
Q: How successful have the psychological operations and civil-affairs teams been?
A: While I was up there at this camp there was a psy-ops element and a civil-affairs team. They had broadcast a radio call-in show with a local mayor and were using a small radio transmitter with an antenna on top of a hill. The entire message was being broadcast off an IPOD. It was then turned over to the locals so that they could begin broadcasting throughout the country.
The civil affairs guys, I could not say enough about them. They operate in small teams on very dangerous roads. They bring validity to the local government. They categorize those infrastructure improvements that are necessary to eliminate human suffering. They build schools. They open medical clinics. They build relationships and quite frankly what we think is incredibly important at SOCOM is the indirect form of warfare and the heart of that is our C.A. and psy-ops. These elements are under our command and control. We are the proponent for psychological operations and civil affairs in the Department of Defense.
Q: Have you seen communities that were initially hostile to U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan turn around and become more welcoming. In other words, are you winning the hearts and minds?
A: It depends on where you go. Urban areas are much more difficult of course. But when you go to where we can do the SOF-type of missions, often in the valleys and rural areas, we do make a lot of friends.
Q: Electrical power seems to be in short supply. How much of a problem does this pose?
A: First of all, you have to have security. Security will allow the infrastructural improvements which will in turn allow the economies to grow and eventually provide validity to the national and local government. Once you have that, the whole system starts to work. So I think getting all of those pieces to work together is the biggest challenge.
Q: You mentioned earlier that the Marines had a new role in special operations. How is it different from the old Force Recon?
A: I think there is an appreciation that special-operations forces are critical in the global war on terror. So as we tried to grow special operations, there was this large capability out there that was untapped. The United States Marine Corps, this wonderful force, had no special operations. So at that time, (former Marine Corps Commandant) Gen. Mike Haggee and I got together and crafted a plan to add Marine Corps forces.
They do three things for us. First is the training of foreign military training units. Most of the Marines don’t yet have the language skill or cultural awareness, but we’ve got them deployed around the world today and they are doing very well at training foreign forces.Again, that’s the indirect form of military warfare. You train partner nations so that they can eliminate terrorism and protect their own border. We don’t have enough special-forces teams and Navy SEALS teams to do that around the world. So the Marines are going to add to our command.
The second thing they do is they give us a forward base direct action force. Now when a MEU (Marine Expeditionary Unit) sails with a special-operations company onboard, it will be an MEU special-operations force, which we will select, train and equip. These are mostly the old Force Recon guys, who are very capable and very impressive. They will provide a forward base for crisis response or conduct training missions. They will be a direct-action force that is out around the world.
There will be a third element to it. And those are enablers. And those are the things we didn’t have that SOCOM will probably need more of. Dog teams, human intelligence, signal intelligence, communications, logistics, support ... three big elements. They will train foreign military units, provide a direct-action force for the Marine Expeditionary Units and enhance the capabilities of the Special Operations Command.
Q: And they will have the resources that they need?
A:I think they will tell you that they are already seeing the impact of that because all of our forces get service-common equipment. If you’re a Marine, you will get everything the Marine Corps is fielding. And then we will give you the SOF-unique equipment. So if you’re getting an M-4 carbine, we will issue what we call the SOF-mod kit, which is a modification kit that goes on top of your M-4. We don’t buy you an M-4. You bring it with you when you come. We just make it better.
Q: Do the American people understand what the average troop is facing in this war?
A: I don’t think they do. And I think having people like The American Legion help spread the word is important because all of them are veterans that do understand what the soldier, sailor, airman and Marine on the battlefield is going through today. But the op-tempo is pretty high. And the op-tempo on SOCOM forces is even higher. We’re managing the biggest sustained deployment in the history of special-operations command. We’re making sure that the people we’re putting on the battlefield have the right skill for the global war on terror, and that took a few changes. The big change down here was when the president signed the unified command plan that said Special Operations Command will be the leader for synchronizing the global war on terror for the Department of Defense. So this headquarters is synchronizing the entire Department of Defense effort for the global war on terror. Before 9/11, we were training, we were organizing, we were equipping. After 9/11, we’re training, we’re organizing, we’re equipping, we’re growing, we’re deploying, and we’re leading the war on terror. It’s much different.
Q: Is morale higher because they are special forces? A SEAL, for instance, is not likely to be a whiner or quitter.
A: The qualification course to get a guy to become a Navy SEAL is legendary as everyone knows. And the importance is, and maybe I’m off the subject a little bit, is a Navy SEAL has to beat the environment before he can be let in. He has to be tougher than the environment that we’re asking him to work in. So some of those environments, especially in the maritime domain, are incredibly difficult. So these are incredible young men that get through it, and they still only graduate about 23 percent of the people that walk in to Basic Underwater Demolition School in Coronado, Calif. So they have worked so hard to get into this course that they are anxious to get out and do the missions that we are asking them to do. And so, while the stress is still there, they are excited about being asked to get out and operate in the battlefield. And quite frankly, I have to put a plug in for the Navy SEALS. They are doing a phenomenal job in Iraq, Afghanistan and all over the world.
Q: What sets special-forces training apart from others?
A: We teach them how to think, not what to think. And so the entire emphasis of special-operations training is out-of-the-box thinking. It’s selecting the right people, getting through our assessment selection course and then putting them into a training program that allows them to problem solve and make decisions. It is not something on an x-y scale. It is thinking through a problem and solving the problem. And then you give them world-class training, you give them world-class equipment, and you empower them to make decisions on the battlefield. We don’t man equipment. We equip the man. It’s about the people.
Most people come into special operations thinking it’s the physical piece that will fail them. It is the mental piece that will get most of them. I went to a selection course a couple of years ago where I watched them. Seventeen people quit getting off the bus. They just got off and took a look at the selection process that they saw in front of them and said, “We quit.” And we said, “The good news is we get to keep you for 48 hours, and you will go back to your unit in a lot better physical condition than when you came here. But then if you change your mind over the 48 hours, you still don’t get to stay – since you already quit, you will go home.”
Q: The standards need to be high.
A: That’s exactly right. We aren’t perfect, but we are out there to get the right people.
Q: You enlisted in the Army in 1967 and are one of the few Vietnam veterans still remaining on active duty. How has your experience in Vietnam influenced your career?
A: Well, I think anytime you can get out on the battlefield to see an army at war, especially in that type of environment, it’s valuable to the rest of your career, whether it’s military or civilian. So I think that although I was a sergeant for three years and didn’t deploy to Vietnam until I went to flight school and became an officer, the experience was a good foundation for what I would see the next 37 years of my career.
Q: What do you think is the biggest difference between the Army of the Vietnam era and today’s military?
A: Obviously the biggest difference is we have an all-volunteer force. I have been on the battlefield many times, and we had great people back in Vietnam, but the Army as a whole today is much better. It’s much better trained and equipped. The quality of the troops on the battlefield is just phenomenal. We really, really do have a fine Army.
Interview: John Raughter





Comments (1)
General Brown was not qualified to command such an organization. Brown has very little experience in commanding ground combat units. He absolutely did nothing to help SOCOM find terrorists. He was a good suck up to Rumsfeld and am not surprised to see him retire soon after Rumsfeld left office. He did pave the way for his friends to make a lot of money off of the war. Brown is not very well respected by the Rangers, SEALs and classified units. He also screwed with people he did not like. For example Rick Bowman, former Night Stalker Commander and he took care of people he liked, for example Bob Richardson, now making big dollars at Boeing. He likes investigations. He initiated more investigations than anyone I know since I have been in the Military. He should be investigated for not telling the President the truth about Tillman. For recommending Gen Dailey to be the commander of JSOC and this decision would lead to the deaths of several special operators during operation Annaconda. For not making sure that 5th Group was properly resourced to fight in Annaconda. For taking care of his friends in the Defense Industry. For wasting time going after soldiers who wrote books about Special Operations.
Posted by Mike | 07/18/07 11:08 AM |