Shipbuilding at home and abroad is not the only way to add to the fleet.
With more than 370 warships, China’s navy (People’s Liberation Army Navy, or PLAN) is the world’s largest. At current production rates, the PLAN will have 435 warships by 2030. The U.S. Navy’s current fleet, by comparison, numbers 292 ships. Under its fiscal 2025 shipbuilding plan, the Navy won’t reach its goal of 381 ships until 2042.
To deter the PLAN, the American people and their elected representatives must expand not only the nation’s maritime capabilities, but also their understanding of what defines the fleet and how to deter the enemy.
Reviving Deterrence is generally about presence – having tangible military capabilities in a given domain or theater to dissuade an enemy from engaging in aggression. Deterrence comes from the Latin dēterreō: “to frighten off.” Warships can be very effective at that.
With just 292 ships, however, America’s navy doesn’t have the ships necessary to be present in all the places it’s needed. This is a relatively new problem. The Navy deployed 859 warships in 1964, 531 in 1978, 594 in 1987. As late as 1997 – almost a decade after the Cold War’s end – the Navy deployed 359 ships.
In an effort address this problem, President Trump created an office “to resurrect the American shipbuilding industry,” and Congress has begun working on the SHIPS Act.
With bipartisan support in the House and Senate, the SHIPS Act aims to revitalize the U.S. Merchant Marine, which is key to transporting military equipment in a time of crisis, expand U.S. sealift capability, facilitate the transport of goods on U.S.-flagged vessels, bolster shipyards with federal support, “enhance shipyard infrastructure” and “the defense shipyard industrial base,” “integrate commercial best practices into the design, building, and repair of Navy and Coast Guard vessels,” and rebuild America’s shipbuilding workforce.
Rebuild and revitalize are the operative words here. Revive might be even more apt. There are only four public U.S. shipyards in operation today, down from 13 in the 1970s. In the 1980s, America’s shipyards employed nearly 200,000 workers (out of a population of 230 million). Today, America’s shipbuilding workforce numbers just 105,000 (out of a population of 340 million).
July’s headlines reveal the consequences: Delivery of two amphibious-assault ships has been delayed due to labor limitations. Delivery of two aircraft carriers has been delayed by what Navy documents call “industry/supply chain performance.”
All of this – diminished fleet size, diminished (and delayed) production, diminished numbers of shipyards and dockworkers – is a function of diminished investment in shipbuilding since the Cold War’s end. While a certain amount of retrenchment after the Soviet Empire’s collapse made sense, some observers warned about cutting too much and urged Washington to maintain capabilities sufficient to deter a rising China.
Washington is now playing catchup. Consistent federal support to enable industry to make long-term investments in facilities and supply chains, to revive the shipbuilding workforce and to allow for multi-ship block buys can make up lost ground – and generate enormous savings.
There’s historical precedent for government action jumpstarting shipbuilding: Federal investment quadrupled the number of U.S. shipyards between 1937 and 1941. Retired Navy Capt. Jerry Hendrix points to an even more dramatic datapoint: “The U.S. Navy grew from 790 ships on December 7, 1941, to 6,768 on August 14, 1945. But these numbers obscure a simple fact: In 1934, before the passage of the first Vinson-Trammell Act, the U.S. Navy’s battle force stood at 320 ships.”
Partnering To add hulls to the fleet rapidly, expansion of domestic shipbuilding could be supplemented by allied shipbuilding. South Korea boasts the world’s largest shipyard. Japan is the world’s third-largest shipbuilder.
Huntington Ingalls Industries and Hyundai Heavy Industries are collaborating to improve technology and training at U.S. shipyards. Enlisting South Korean and/or Japan shipyards to build U.S. warships is the next step, but that would require the president to waive a 1965 law related to domestic warship construction. Such a waiver is permitted if the president “determines that it is in the national security interest of the United States.”
Deterring the PLAN from controlling Taiwan, the South China Sea and the sea lanes that carry 30% of world trade is definitely in the national interest.
“If we have a chance, we can build a very good ship for the U.S. Navy,” vows Lee Sang-bong of South Korea’s Hyundai Heavy Industries.
Washington should take him up on the offer. Given the urgency of the mission and existing limitations to fulfill that mission, integrating foreign-built ships into the fleet makes sense.
It’s worth noting that senior Navy officials have proposed purchasing foreign-built vessels. The bipartisan Commission on the National Defense Strategy recommends “procurement of ships from allies to supplement U.S. production.”
It’s also worth noting that America’s military has used foreign-built warships and weapons in the past: Several U.S. warships were built at foreign docks, including Guam, Tutuila, Panay, Oahu and Luzon. Americans flew 600 British-built Spitfires during World War II. The United States deployed British Harriers during the Cold War and bought Britian’s entire Harrier fleet in 2011. Today, America’s military relies on allies to produce howitzers, helicopters, anti-tank missiles and anti-missile systems.
Reimagining Yet shipbuilding – whether at home, abroad or both – is only one pathway to the goal of adding hulls to the fleet and thus deterring the PLAN.
In recent years, the Navy has extended the service life of at least 15 warships. That effort could continue with prudent matching of near-term needs with current vessel capabilities.
In addition, the Navy could reactivate mothballed ships. After all, they were mothballed because someone had the good sense to recognize they might be needed in the future. And here we are. The Congressional Budget Office notes that Washington reactivated 50 destroyers before U.S. entry into World War II, hundreds of ships during the Korean War, USS New Jersey during the Vietnam War, and USS Iowa, USS Missouri, USS Wisconsin and USS New Jersey during the Reagan rebuild.
There’s a cost to reactivating or extending the service life of warships, but it’s a fraction of the cost of building new ones – and takes a fraction of the time.
Unmanned vessels also will play a role in augmenting the fleet. Already, the Fifth Fleet’s Task Force 59 is teaming unmanned vessels with manned warships to secure the Middle East’s vital waterways. The Navy plans to produce and deploy 32 unmanned reconnaissance vessels – per month. And then there are attritable systems. Indo-Pacific Command commander Adm. Samuel Paparo revealed plans in 2024 to “turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape” if the PLAN lunges at Taiwan. Paparo emphasized for Beijing that the capabilities needed to execute his plan – featuring attritable attack-drones – are “real” and “deliverable.”
The fleet also could be reimagined – and enlarged – by turning every ship into a guided-missile platform. Military strategists note this could be easily and cheaply done by lashing containerized missile launchers onto supply ships and merchant ships. The idea leapt from concept to reality during exercises last year in the Pacific.
Redefining Defense policymakers also could explore redefining the roles of Coast Guard and Army assets.
Coast Guard cutters have deployed to support freedom of navigation ops far from America’s coast; maritime strategists call for more extensive use of Coast Guard vessels in this manner. More broadly, there have been proposals in Congress and among military thinkers to bring the Coast Guard under the Pentagon’s umbrella, which would harness fresh maritime capabilities.
The Army deploys 300 maritime vessels. A watchword in today’s Pentagon is “jointness” – the notion that all branches must work together across all domains to deter and defeat threats. Increased Army-Navy jointness could enable a more dynamic use of the Army’s oceangoing assets. Interestingly, the Army in 2024 activated its first overseas watercraft unit in decades.
Speaking of jointness, deterring the PLAN isn’t solely the Navy’s responsibility. Its sister branches are sharing the burden.
The Pentagon is revitalizing airfields on Tinian, Wake Island and Peleliu, from which U.S. bombers and fighters can deploy. The Pentagon recently revealed that F-35s are now carrying long-range antiship missiles – tailormade for deterring and, if necessary, destroying the PLAN fleet.
Air Force and Marine Corps F-35s are operating from the Philippines. The Air Force is basing F-15EXs and F-35As on Okinawa, has deployed A-10s in the Philippines and is rotation-basing B-52s in Australia. In 2024-2025, the Air Force deployed B-2s to Australia, F-22s to Brunei, Indonesia and the Philippines, and B-1s to South Korea and Japan.
Pentagon reports detail how Beijing has developed missile capabilities “to deter or counter third-party intervention” and prevent the U.S. from projecting assets into the region in a time of crisis. The Pentagon’s shorthand for this is “A2AD” – anti-access/area-denial. The Army and Marines are reminding Beijing that A2AD can cut both ways. Nimble Army and Marine Corps units armed with land-based missile systems (such as NMESIS, HIMARS and Typhon) have deployed to Palau, the Philippines and elsewhere in the region. From April into June, NMESIS-armed Marines and HIMARS-armed soldiers deployed to the Philippines’ northernmost islands.
Helping hands China’s naval capabilities are daunting. But Beijing has no real allies. Conversely, America’s not-so-secret weapon is its interconnected global alliance system. Allies from across the region – and outside the region – are key to deterring the PLAN.
Japan is acquiring Tomahawk cruise missiles, deploying a fleet of 22 attack submarines, converting two ships into aircraft carriers armed with F-35s and bolstering defenses on its southern islands. In the event of hostilities, Japan and the United States plan to deploy antiship and anti-air units on Japan’s southernmost islands.
The Philippines has welcomed U.S. warships back to Subic Bay and other facilities. U.S. and Philippine forces are conducting coastal-defense and amphibious exercises.
U.S. F-35s are operating from British aircraft carriers in the Pacific. Britain, Italy and France plan coordinated deployments of their aircraft carriers in the Pacific. All three have been active in the Indo-Pacific. NATO allies Britain, Canada, France and Germany plus non-NATO allies Australia, New Zealand and Japan have conducted freedom-of-navigation operations through the Taiwan Strait.
During his tenure as chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Adm. Mike Mullen promoted the “thousand-ship navy” concept. “As we combine our advantages, I envision a 1,000-ship navy – a fleet-in-being, if you will, made up of the best capabilities of all freedom-loving navies of the world.” Indeed, a back-of-the napkin tally of the U.S. fleet plus that of oceangoing U.S. treaty allies reveals a naval force of some 1,200 ships.
The Combined Maritime Forces -- a 46-nation partnership focused on counterterrorism, counterpiracy, and sea-lane security in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea – offers a glimpse how Mullen’s navy of navies can work. It’s not difficult to envision U.S., Japanese, Australian, South Korean, Indian, and NATO naval assets forming a similar taskforce dedicated to freedom of navigation and open waterways in the Indo-Pacific.
But to build such a coalition in the Indo-Pacific, Americans need to view the alliances they created after World War II as assets to nurture rather than liabilities to cut. As Gen. James Mattis observes, “Our strength as a nation is inextricably linked to the strength of our unique and comprehensive system of alliances.”
Challenge This all-of-the-above, all-hands-on-deck approach seems sensible and feasible. Of course, naval strategists and shipbuilding experts can plot the pathways to additional maritime capabilities – and the attendant pitfalls – far better than I. But from the perspective of a student of U.S. history, the main impediment seems to be insufficient public recognition of the challenge – which means policymakers must do a better job making the case for deterrence in general and enhanced maritime capabilities in specific.
As the Commission on the National Defense Strategy argues, “A bipartisan ‘call to arms’ is urgently needed so that the United States can make the major changes and significant investments now rather than wait for the next Pearl Harbor or 9/11.”
Alan W. Dowd serves as director of the Sagamore Institute Center for America's Purpose. Any opinions expressed in this article are strictly his own.
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